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Abstract. This paper details a robust collaborative intrusion detection 
methodology for detecting attacks within a Cloud federation. It is a proactive 
model and the responsibility for managing the elements of the Cloud is 
distributed among several monitoring nodes. Since there are a wide range of 
elements to manage, complexity grows proportionally with the size of the Cloud, 
so a suitable communication and monitoring hierarchy is adopted. Our 
architecture consists of four major entities: the Cloud Broker, the monitoring 
nodes, the local coordinator (Super Nodes), and the global coordinator 
(Command and Control server - C2). Utilising monitoring nodes into our 
architecture enhances the performance and response time, yet achieves higher 
accuracy and a broader spectrum of protection. For collaborative intrusion 
detection, we use the Dempster Shafer theory of evidence via the role of the 
Cloud Broker. Dempster Shafer executes as a main fusion node, with the role to 
collect and fuse the information provided by the monitors, taking the final 
decision regarding a possible attack.  
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1 Introduction 
Adoption of Cloud technologies allows critical infrastructure to benefit from dynamic 
resource allocation for managing unpredictable load peaks. Given the public awareness 
of critical infrastructure and their importance, there needs to be an assurance that these 
systems are built to function in a secure manner. Appropriate security procedures have 
to be selected when developing such systems and documented accordingly. Most 
existing technologies and methodologies for developing secure applications only 
explore security requirements in either critical infrastructure or Cloud Computing. 
Individual methodologies and techniques or standards may even only support a subset 
of specific critical infrastructure requirements. Requirement based security issues can 
be quite different for these applications and for common IT Cloud applications but need 
to be considered in combination for the given context. 
  
Automation has become an indispensable part of service provision and has increased 
exponentially as demand for digital services and interconnectivity has increased. The 
reliance on these systems has resulted in ICT playing a key role in the provisioning of 
services that critical infrastructures deliver to the general population. Disruptions in one 
part of an infrastructure may propagate throughout the system and have cascading 
effects on other sectors (Ten, Manimaran, & Liu, 2010). Critical infrastructure 
protection relates to application processes, electronic systems, and information stored 
and processed by such systems.  
The concern is that critical IT resources and information in Cloud systems may be 
vulnerable to cyber attacks or unauthorised access. The primary security concerns with 
Cloud environments pertain to security, availability, and performance. Many attacks 
are designed to block users from accessing services and providers from delivering 
services, i.e. Denial of Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Service 
providers may face significant penalties due to their inability to deliver services to 
customers in accordance with regulatory requirements and Service Level Agreements 
(SLA) (Rak et al., 2012). DDoS attacks are a serious and growing problem for corporate 
and government services conducting their business via the Internet. Resource 
management to prevent DDoS attacks is receiving attention, as the Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS) architecture, effectively ‘supports’ the attacker. When the Cloud system 
observes the high workload on the flooded service, it is likely the Cloud federation 
(which is the practice of interconnecting the Cloud computing environments of two or 
more service providers for the purpose of load balancing traffic and accommodating 
spikes in demand) will start providing more computational power in order to cope with 
it.  
Traditional network monitoring schemes are not scalable to high speed networks 
such as Cloud networks, let alone Cloud federations. It is clear that an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) alone cannot protect the Cloud environment from attack. If an 
IDS is deployed in each Cloud Computing region, but without any cooperation and 
communication, it may easily suffer from single point of failure attack. The Cloud 
environment could not support services continually, as it is not always easy for the 
victim to determine that is being attacked, or where the attack is originating from. A 
new and novel approach to the aforementioned problem is required, that is, providing 
Security as a Service in a Cloud federation. Our solution encompasses the following 
methodological attributes: 
 We represent Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) within a Cloud federation as 
interconnected domains.  
 Once a Belief is generated that an attack is underway (ba), this is sent to a Command 
and Control server (C2). The C2 queries the Cloud Broker, and the Broker checks 
the value against its stored values (as it may not have been published yet), and 
invokes a global poll procedure in which other C2s within the other domains are 
queried.  
 The Cloud Broker coordinates attack responses, both within the domain itself, and 
with other domains, and is facilitating inter-domain cooperation. 
  
─ Dempster-Shafer (D-S) is used to fuse the generated beliefs and make a system 
wide decision. This cooperation between CSPs ensures that the scalable defence 
required against DDoS attacks is in an efficient manner; aiming to improve the 
overall resilience of the interconnected infrastructure.  
 The development of a collaborative intrusion detection heuristic based on D-S theory 
of evidence, and the inclusion of confidence values for improved accuracy. 
─ We are improving the decision making precision and accuracy for autonomous 
information sharing in a federated Cloud environment via a two stage fusion 
process. 
2 Background 
The Cloud Computing paradigm is increasingly being adopted in critical sectors such 
as energy, transport, and finance. Deploying high assurance services in the Cloud 
increases cyber security concerns, as successful attacks could lead to outages of key 
services that have high socioeconomic implications. This exposes these infrastructures 
to cyber risks and results in demand for protection against cyber-attacks, even more 
than traditional systems. Critical security issues include: data integrity; user 
confidentiality; availability of data; and trust among entities. Securing applications and 
services provided in the Cloud against cyber attacks is hard to achieve due to the 
complexity, heterogeneity, and dynamic nature of such systems.  
Site management and monitoring has improved for critical infrastructure facilities as 
they have become more progressively connected to the Internet. The added convenience 
of connectivity, however, has turned the once-limited attack surface of these industries 
into a fertile landscape for cyber-attacks. Due to the potentially high profile effects of 
attacks to critical infrastructure systems, these industries have become even more 
attractive targets for cybercriminals (Trend Micro Incorporated, 2015). The sensitive 
nature of critical infrastructure services deems their protection critical, and their 
services hereof. This is predominantly caused by the inadequacies and limitations of 
current security protection measures which fail to cope with the sheer size and vast 
dynamic nature of the Cloud environment.  
Attacks and failures are inevitable; therefore, it is important to develop approaches 
to understand the Cloud environment under attack. The current lack of collaboration 
among different components within a cloud federation, or among different providers, 
for detection or prevention of attacks is the focus of our work (Á. MacDermott, Shi, & 
Kifayat, 2015). Our research focuses on maintaining the availability of the data, as 
previously described, the service in question could be financial, organisational, or on 
demand. Protecting the Cloud environment from DDoS attacks is imperative as these 
attacks can threaten the availability of Cloud functionalities.  
3 Security as a Service 
Detecting intrusion patterns in the Cloud environment involves looking for behavioural 
changes. This process could involve signature based detection for DoS attacks, which 
  
must be robust against noise data, and false positives and false negatives produced. 
Anomaly detection is an approach for detecting behavioural changes as these schemes 
often aggregate normal behaviour through their modelling of normal versus abnormal 
traffic. The main requirement of our solution is to provide protection for cri tical 
infrastructure services being hosted in the Cloud environment through novel intrusion 
detection techniques (Á; MacDermott, Shi, & Kifayat, 2015).  
Monitoring is a core function of any integrated network and service management 
platform. Cloud computing makes monitoring an even more complex infrastructure 
support function, since it includes multiple physical and virtualized resources and 
because it spans several layers of the Cloud software stack, from IaaS to PaaS, and 
SaaS. Using our Security as a Service method, collaborative intrusion detection is 
possible in a federated Cloud environment.  
The system uses a Cloud Broker to propagate information to the C2 entities in each 
CSP domain – this is in the form of Black lists and White lists. Monitoring nodes are 
used to observe changes or suspicious activities in local domains. These values are 
stored in a Grey list of ambiguous observations. For pre-emptive warning, Beliefs are 
generated and assigned to all subsets of possible outcomes based on the trigger.  
We assign Beliefs to the outcome in the form of, random attack variable x would 
have a basic probability assignment of { }, {attack}, {no attack}, and {attack, no 
attack}. { } represents an empty subset with a value of 0, whereas {attack, no attack} 
represents uncertainty, i.e. it could be either. An advantage of using D-S theory of 
evidence to fuse Beliefs is that the algorithm can start from an uncertain state and allow 
the observed evidences form in each of the subnets gradually. D-S utilises orthogonal 
sum to combine the evidences. We define the belief functions, describing the belief in 
a hypothesis A, as Bel1(A),Bel2(A); then the belief function after the combination is 
defined as: 
 
Bel(A) = Bel1(A)⨁Bel2(A) 
 
The mass function after the combination can be described as: 
 
m(A) = K−1 . ∑ m1(Ai)
Ai∩Bi=A
m2(Bj) 
 
Where K is called Orthogonal Coefficient, and it is defined as: 
 
K = ∑ m1(Ai)
Ai∩Bi≠∅
m2(Bj) 
3.1 Implementation 
Collaborative security between CSPs in a Cloud federation can offer holistic security 
to those in this scheme. Information sharing in this approach is automated which we 
conceive to be an important aspect of our approach. Dividing the system into domains 
  
makes the system more scalable, and Belief generation and sharing of threat 
information could be used as a warning of an imminent attack. Previous work of ours 
(Á. MacDermott, Shi, & Kifayat, 2015) details our simulations using Riverbed Modeler 
18.0 and convey how attacks could propagate throughout a Cloud federation. At this 
stage of the simulation, the main purposes were to analyse the role a Broker could have 
with autonomous sharing of information; the role of a single monitoring entity on the 
entire federation vs the C2s monitoring their own sub domains; and how an attack 
within a Cloud federation could affect the interdependent services present. 
Next, we are showing the actions to be taken in the simulation, from the point where 
an intrusion is believed to have been detected. The integration of the decisions coming 
from different IDSs has emerged as a technique that could strengthen the final decision. 
Sensor fusion can be defined as the process of collecting information from multiple and 
possibly heterogeneous sources and combining them to obtain a more descriptive, 
intuitive and meaningful result (Thomas & Narayanaswamy, 2011). Related work in 
the field of sensor fusion has been carried out mainly with methods such as probability 
theory, evidence theory, voting fusion theory, fuzzy logic theory, or neural network in 
order to aggregate information.  
Our implementation of our D-S for collaborative intrusion detection is in C#, and 
focuses on demonstrating the application of the fusion algorithm in an autonomous 
information sharing scheme. For proof of concept we are using a lower amount of 
entities to convey how the communication occurs and the information would be 
exchanged within the infrastructure; future work would involve expanding this solution 
to cope with a larger scale. Firstly, an IP address is entered into the program and the 
value is compared to the Black list and White list to see if the values are present.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Checking list values to determine if IP present 
 
When compared against the lists, if the IP address is in the Black list then the user is 
‘Blocked’ – source code for this is conveyed in Figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Blocked user key return 
 
  
If the entered IP address is present on the White list then the user is ‘Permitted Access’, 
as illustrated in Figure 3. The console outputs the other values from the White list, and 
this is also a separate file than can be viewed.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Value on white list 
 
If the entered IP address is not present on either list, the value is stored in the Grey list 
and assigned a threat value which we use to form the Belief. Hypothesis sets based on 
all values between 0 and 1 are included within the program, as well as mass values and 
plausibility functions.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Threat value ranges 
 
Figure 4 shows the threat value ranges used, and the ability to increase/decrease the 
associated risk due to occurrences on the list is also an option. Increased occurrences 
could cause the risk score to increase, e.g. beginning on the white list, moving to the 
grey list, but then being promoted to the black list. For a value over 70 this would trigger 
a Belief generation and the associated hypothesis values output. Figure 5 is an example 
of a threat score of 80 and the associated hypothesis set generated, and Figure 6 shows 
a score of 60. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Example hypothesis set generation for a threat score of 80 
 
  
This value is sent to the Broker and compared against the Black and White lists, as the 
information may not have been propagated to the C2s within the federation. The Broker 
then queries the adjacent monitoring entities and requests they generate a Belief based 
on the original value.   
 
 
Fig. 6. A belief generation of 0.6 
 
In the example of a Cloud federation, the Broker takes three belief values and fuses 
them together to make a system wide decision. The values would then be updated to 
the lists (White or Black) and calculations of these combinations are as follows:  
 
Belief combination of two values – 𝑩𝒆𝒍(𝑨) =  𝑩𝒆𝒍𝟏(𝑨) ⊕  𝑩𝒆𝒍𝟐(𝑨) 
(m1) we have belief that the proposition is true for just state Attack is m1({Attack}) = 
0.8) and similarly m1({No Attack}) = 0.1 with m1({Either}) = 0.1 
  
Then we take another assessment m2 with m2 ({Attack}) = 0.6, m2({No Attack}) = 0.3 
with m2({Either}) = 0.1 
 
The joint mass function would be m1,2(A)=(1/1-K) m1({Either})m2({Either}) with 
K= m1({Attack}) m2({No Attack}) + m1({No Attack}) m2({Attack}) = 0.8*0.3 + 
0.1*0.6 = 0.30 
  
So m1,2(A) = (1/1-0.30) *0.1*0.1 = 0.007 
 
Belief combination of three values - 𝑩𝒆𝒍(𝑨) =  𝑩𝒆𝒍𝟏(𝑨) ⊕ 𝑩𝒆𝒍𝟐(𝑨) ⨁ 𝑩𝒆𝒍𝟑(𝑨) 
(m1) we have belief that the proposition is true for state Attack which is 0.3 (i.e. 
m1({Attack}) = 0.8) and similarly m1({No Attack}) = 0.1 with m1({Either}) = 0.1 
  
Then we take another assessment m2 with m2 ({Attack}) = 0.6, m2({No Attack}) = 0.3 
with m2({Either}) = 0.1 
 
m3 associated values include {Attack}) = 0.0, m3({No Attack}) = 0.5 with m3({Either}) 
= 0.1  
 
The joint mass function would be m1,2,3(A) = (1/1-K) m1({Either})m2({Either}) 
m3({Either}) with: 
K = m1({Attack}) m2({No Attack}) + m1({No Attack}) m2({Attack}) + m1({Attack}) 
m3({No Attack}) + m1({No Attack}) m3({Attack}) + m2({Attack}) m3({No Attack}) + 
m2({No Attack}) m3({Attack}) = 0.8*0.3 + 0.1*0.6 + 0.8*0.5 + 0.1*0.0 + 0.6*0.5 + 
0.3*0.0 = 1 
  
  
So m1,2,3(A) = (1/1-1) *0.1*0.1*0.5 =  n/a - cannot divide by 0 
 
Belief combination of three values - 𝑩𝒆𝒍(𝑨) =  𝑩𝒆𝒍𝟏(𝑨) ⊕ 𝑩𝒆𝒍𝟐(𝑨) ⨁ 𝑩𝒆𝒍𝟑(𝑨) 
(m1) we have belief that the proposition is true for state Attack which is 0.3 (i.e. 
m1({Attack}) = 0.8) and similarly m1({No Attack}) = 0.1 with m1({Either}) = 0.1 
  
Then we take another assessment m2 with m2 ({Attack}) = 0.6, m2({No Attack}) = 0.3 
with m2({Either}) = 0.1 
 
m3 associated values include {Attack}) = 0.9, m3({No Attack}) = 0.05 with 
m3({Either}) = 0.05  
 
The joint mass function would be m1,2,3(A) = (1/1-K) m1({Either})m2({Either}) 
m3({Either}) with: 
K = m1({Attack}) m2({No Attack}) + m1({No Attack}) m2({Attack}) + m1({Attack}) 
m3({No Attack}) + m1({No Attack}) m3({Attack}) + m2({Attack}) m3({No Attack}) + 
m2({No Attack}) m3({Attack}) = 0.8*0.3 + 0.1*0.6 + 0.8*0.05 + 0.1*0.9 + 0.6*0.05 + 
0.3*0.09 = 0.73 
  
So m1,2,3(A) = (1/1-0.73) *0.1*0.1*0.5 = 0.01851 
4 Evaluation 
The use of D-S rule is mathematically possible only if 𝑚𝑎  and 𝑚𝑏are not conflicting, 
i.e. if there is a focal element of 𝑚𝑎  and a focal element 𝑧 of 𝑚𝑏 satisfying (𝑦 ∩ 𝑧) ≠
 ∅. Merging two belief masses with the conjunctive rule defined above produces a sub-
additive belief probability assignment, meaning that the sum of belief masses on focal 
elements can be less than one, in which case it is assumed that the missing or 
complement belief mass gets assigned to the empty set. If desirable, the normality 
assumption m( /0) = 0 can be recovered by dividing each belief mass by a normalization 
coefficient (Josang & Pope, 2012). This rule is associative, and the normalisation in   
D-S redistributes conflicting belief masses to non-conflicting ones, and tends to 
eliminate any conflicting characteristics in the resulting belief mass distribution. This 
rule of combination can be applied to avoid this particular problem by allowing all 
conflicting belief masses to be allocated to the empty set. 
When performing the belief calculations by two values the returned result is quite 
surprising. When comparing two high belief generations the assumption is that the 
combined belief value would also be a high number, however it is a lower value. The 
correlation between high belief values and low fused outputs suggests that the lower 
the fused output the higher the risk. The same is understood for two fused low belief 
values generate a high fused output, which would be a low risk. It is not clear if this is 
due to our calculations but these metrics have been compared on numerous belief 
fusions and this is a similar occurrence. The mass value must be between 0 and 1 but 
not inclusive as this seems to skew the calculations, e.g. using a value of 0 would render 
  
the combination calculation (m1, 2(A)) uncalculatable as you cannot divide by 0 which 
would be a pertinent value. A coefficient value of 1 would leave the combination 
calculation having to divide by 0 (1/1-1) which is an impossible calculation. Also, 
having a coefficient of 0 would give a negative risk output, which is also an unusable 
value.  
Implementing our Security as a Service solution, the below limitations of D-S can 
be evident: 
 Associative – for rule combination, the order of the information in the 
aggregated evidences does not impact the result. A non-associative 
combination is necessary for many cases. 
 Non-weighted – rule combination implies we trust all evidences equally. 
However, in reality, our trust on different evidences may differ, which means 
we should consider various factors for each evidence.  
We have demonstrated how D-S can provide collaborative intrusion detection, 
however there may be cases where the decision may be inaccurate, and if a domain 
under attack generation the Belief of origin then it would still need to take action against 
the condition. D-S when applied in an autonomous collaborative environment should 
apply a weight of confidence when the belief generation occurs. If CSPs collaboratively 
vote no attack, but one CSP is adamant it is being attacked, there should be a way to 
overrule the decision based on the strength of the associated trust or confidence value. 
The algorithm should be extended further to take this into consideration, and we 
propose a two stage collaborative detection process for conflicting decisions.  
Two stage D-S fusion for conflicting decisions is an option for solving this issue. 
Post Belief generation processing is needed for application to this area to facilitate 
information exchange for defence. Via the inclusion of confidence values the accuracy 
of decisions can be improved. Protecting the local services of the CSP but proactively 
warning others of the potential threat. If the fused decision is “No Attack” but the Belief 
of origin has a high confidence value, then the domain of origin would take action 
against the suspect observation, but send the Belief value 
(𝐵𝐴(𝐼𝑃, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) to the Broker to store in its local Grey list. 
Should an adjacent CSP query the Broker regarding the suspect IP in the future, it has 
the information from the origin CSP. 
5 Conclusion 
We have presented our Security as a Service solution, a novel platform for the 
protection of infrastructure services in a federated Cloud environment. D-S theory is 
extended to meet the domain management needs and to facilitate autonomous sharing 
of information. The novel contributions of this project are that it provides the means by 
which DDoS attacks are detected within a cloud federation, so as to enable an early 
propagated response to block the attack, particularly by the interdependent CSPs within 
the federation. This is effectively inter-domain cooperation as these CSPs will 
cooperate with each other to offer holistic security, and add to the defence in depth.    
D-S is used to facilitate this autonomous sharing of information, and to fuse the 
  
generated beliefs to form a system wide decision. This cooperation between CSPs 
ensures the scalable defence required against DDoS attacks is in an efficient and cost 
effective way. Protecting the federated cloud against cyber-attacks is a vital concern, 
due to the potential for significant economic consequences. The effects of attacks can 
span from the loss of data, to the potential isolation of parts of the federation. Our 
simulations offer proof of concept, and deem the applicability of D-S to this area 
promising but still with evident limitations. 
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